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In this paper, we develop a measure of household resources that converts total
nancial, nonnancial, and annuitized assets into an expected annual amount of wealth
per person in retirement. We use this measure, which we call \annualized comprehensive
wealth," to investigate spend-down behavior among a panel of older households in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998 to 2006. Our analysis indicates that for
most retired households, comprehensive wealth balances decline much more slowly than
their remaining life expectancies, so that the predominate trend is for real annualized
wealth actually to rise signicantly with age over the course of retirement. Comparing
the estimated age proles for annualized wealth with proles simulated from several
dierent life cycle models, we nd that a model that takes into account uncertain
longevity, random medical expenses, and intended bequests lines up best with the broad
patterns of rising annualized wealth in the HRS.
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11 Introduction
The ability to nance consumption in old age depends not only on the total amount of
resources at the onset of retirement, but also, crucially, on how quickly or slowly those
resources are spent after retirement. To provide a new empirical perspective on spend-
down patterns, we construct a measure of the total resources available per expected year
of life for a panel of retired households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from
1998 to 2006. We call our measure \annualized comprehensive wealth." Our measure is
comprehensive because in addition to net worth as it is usually dened|the sum of nancial
and nonnancial assets net of debt|it also includes the value of Social Security benets,
dened-benet pensions, and, for eligible recipients, transfer payments such as Food Stamps
and Supplemental Security Income. For many retirees, these additional items constitute a
sizable fraction of total resources. Our measure is an annualized concept in the sense that it
measures the amount of wealth that is available for each expected year of remaining life and
for each person in a retired household. In examining this measure of retirement wealth, we
were motivated by the following reasoning. Annualized comprehensive wealth measures the
constant amount that a retired household could aord to spend, in expectation, every year
until they die. If the micro-data showed a strong tendency for annualized comprehensive
wealth to either fall or rise substantially in retirement, we would probably want to know
why.
Our paper adds to a large and growing body of research on the evolution and adequacy
of retirement wealth.1 Most directly, our paper is related to two studies that highlight the
importance of precautionary saving for explaining the wealth holdings of older Americans
(Palumbo, 1999; De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2006). These studies each nd that wealth
balances do not decline as quickly as standard life-cycle models would predict but that a
slow decumulation pattern can be explained (at least partly) by the precautionary eects
of uncertain out-of-pocket medical costs. The key contribution of our study is to look at a
similar set of questions through the lens of annualized wealth, which we argue provides a
more direct measure of the evolution of household resources. While an annualized concept
of wealth is not itself an entirely new idea,3 as far as we know, we are the rst to examine
1The research on retirement wealth is too extensive to include more than a representative set of citations.
Skinner (2007) reviews some recent work on the adequacy of household savings. A number of previous
papers nd that a substantial fraction of aging households are poorly positioned to nance retirement (see
Bernheim, 1992; Munnell and Soto, 2005; Mitchell and Moore, 1998) and that the situation may be even
worse for younger age groups (Munnell, Webb, and Delorme, 2006).
2 However, other studies generally nd
that observed behavior is in line with the predictions generated by stochastic life cycle models (see Engen,
Gale, and Uccello, 1999, 2005; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006). Finally, another set of papers
directly examines changes in consumption at retirement (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006; Aguiar and Hurst,
2005; Blau, 2008).
3For example, it closely resembles Friedman's (1957) denition of permanent income that has been
central to numerous studies of household consumption. In the context of wealth adequacy, Wol (2002) and
2annualized wealth in the context of a life-cycle model.
What are the advantages of looking at annualized wealth as opposed to wealth balances
alone? First, it helps us identify the direction of change in a household's ability to nance
future spending in retirement. Whereas a decline in wealth balances can be consistent with
either an increase or a decrease in the amount of resources available per expected remaining
year of life, a decline in annualized wealth implies an unambiguous contraction. Second,
annualized comprehensive wealth is a measurement concept that could help distinguish be-
tween reductions in consumption due to insucient resources (a case in which we would
expect both annualized wealth and consumption to be low) and the consequences of other
motives, such as precautionary savings or intentional bequests (cases in which we would
expect annualized wealth to exceed consumption). Whether annualized wealth rises or falls
during retirement therefore can provide important clues that can help in sorting out the
underlying causes of spending and saving behavior in retirement. Finally, because we gen-
erally lack household-level panel data on wealth and consumption changes over retirement,
annualized wealth may provide a bridge between wealth balances and what those balances
imply for annual consumption possibilities.4 Developing that bridge is one of the principle
motivations and contributions of the current study.
Our analysis of the HRS panel documents strongly rising patterns of annualized wealth
in retirement. We nd that the median value of annualized comprehensive wealth for the
cohort of households aged 70 to 75 years in 1998 rises signicantly in retirement, from about
$32,800 per person per year in 1998 to about $42,200 per person per year in 2006|a net
increase of nearly 30 percent in just eight years. At the median, comprehensive wealth
therefore tends to fall much more slowly than life expectancy shortens in old age. Our
regression-based estimates of the age prole from ages 65 to 90 indicate that the median
surviving household tends to see its annualized comprehensive wealth climb from $25,600
per person per expected year of life at age 65 to more than $50,000 by age 90.5
As in other studies of household savings, we nd considerable heterogeneity in the
Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Sherlund (2006) report ratios of annuitized retirement wealth to poverty using
cross-sectional data. Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Romanov (2007) use Social Security data to compare
annuitized wealth for a particular older cohort at two dierent points in time. Love, Smith, and McNair
(2008) study annualized wealth in recent waves of the Health and Retirement Study.
4Note the distinction between consumption possibilities and optimal consumption. As we show later,
in certain specications of a life-cycle model, annualized wealth tracks optimal consumption fairly closely,
particularly over the rst half of retirement. In general, however, the two concepts are not the same.
Annualized comprehensive wealth cannot directly be interpreted as a measure of welfare.
5Survivorship introduces complications into any study examining the evolution of wealth. As we discuss
in more detail below, the panel nature of our data allow us to control, at least partly, for some sources of
survivorship bias (e.g., the over-representation of longer-lived, wealthier households that can lead to bias
in cross section studies). In addition, we also show how our empirical results change when we control for
subjective survival expectations and for non-random attrition. Nevertheless, because survivors may always
dier in important ways from non-survivors, it is not possible to eliminate all potential sources of bias.
3evolution of household wealth, with annualized wealth falling for some households and
rising for others. The distribution, however, is heavily tilted toward increases in annualized
wealth. Indeed, we estimate that nearly one-half of older households saw their annualized
comprehensive wealth rise by more than 25 percent from 1998 through 2006, while about
one in eight experienced a decrease of 25 percent or more over the same time period.
Further, this distribution of outcomes is surprisingly similar when we look across marital
status and even household income. We also nd (to varying degrees) patterns of increasing
median annualized wealth across race, education, and health groups. Looking at wealth
components, we nd that both nancial and nonnancial wealth rose in annualized terms
over the sample period.6 Although some of the increase in nonnancial wealth in the HRS
panel seems to have been accounted for by large capital gains accruing to housing between
1998 and 2006, we nd that we would estimate a net increase in annualized wealth in
retirement even absent those unusual gains.
Why might households draw down their wealth balances so slowly relative to life ex-
pectancy? To consider some possible explanations, we simulate several specications of
life-cycle models of retirement consumption, adding to the simplest models some elements
that have been emphasized in previous studies: uncertain longevity (Yaari, 1965; Davies,
1981; Hubbard, 1987; Hurd, 1989), random (and potentially large) out-of-pocket medical
expenses (Palumbo, 1999; French and Jones, 2004; Anderson, French, and Lam, 2004), and
explicit bequest motives (Kotliko and Summers, 1981; Hurd, 1987, 1989; Bernheim, 1991;
Laitner and Juster, 1996; Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2002; De Nardi, 2004; Kopczuk and
Lupton, 2007). We benchmark our dierent model specications to the HRS data on a
household-by-household basis and compare simulated annualized wealth trajectories with
the empirical trends. We nd that although models incorporating either random medical
expenses or altruistic bequests can generate upward-sloping proles of annualized wealth,
the simulated proles are generally much 
atter than those evident in the HRS panel data.
Rather, the strength of the overall increase in annualized comprehensive wealth seen in the
HRS lines up best with model simulations that incorporate both of these saving motives,
in combination with uncertain longevity. In particular, we nd that the prospect of large
medical expenses induces retirees to build a precautionary buer early on, while a desire to
leave a bequest leads them to maintain \excess savings" toward the end of life, and the size
of these eects are not far from the patterns in the HRS.
We also nd that while conventional life cycle specications may do a good job explain-
6Essentially by denition, the annualized values of Social Security and DB pension wealth are virtually
constant over the retirement period. We convert expected Social Security and DB pension payments into
a present value and then back into an annualized value in order to account for the nonindexation of some
benets as well as the eect of survivors benets on the expected resource stream of married couples. See
Appendix 1 for more details.
4ing some general tendencies of annualized wealth changes for the median household, they
are less successful at matching the heterogeneity in wealth trajectories across individual
households. The key contribution of our modeling approach is to investigate the behavior
of annualized wealth (rather than on wealth levels) in standard specications of stochastic
life cycle models. Doing so not only allows us to connect the simulation ndings to our
empirical measures; it also highlights how the evolution of consumption (what we would
ideally like to measure) and annualized wealth (what we are actually able to measure) are
likely to dier depending on the relative importance of bequests and precautionary saving
at the tail end of the life cycle.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use longitudinal data from the 1998 through 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). The HRS is a panel of older households that began by surveying respondents
aged 51 to 61 in 1992. The HRS has reinterviewed those households every two years and has
added several additional cohorts along the way. In 1998, the HRS merged with a similar
survey called Aging and Health Dynamics (AHEAD), which covered households aged 70
and over in 1993. The 1998 wave of the HRS also added two additional cohorts: the War
Baby cohort (aged 51 to 56 in 1998) and the Children of the Depression cohort (aged 68
to 74 that year). Thus, the 1998 wave is the rst to represent the full population of U.S.
households aged 51 and over|for this reason, we begin our analysis with the 1998 wave.7
We select households aged 65 or more in the 1998 HRS survey, and we collect informa-
tion on households that survive through the 2006 wave. We focus on surviving households
to mitigate the eect of survivorship bias: since we are interested in wealth proles, non-
random attrition from the sample could signicantly impact the results. For example, if
we included non-surviving 1998 households and lower-wealth households were more likely
to drop out, we could nd upward-sloping median wealth proles just from changing sam-
ple composition, even if each individual household's prole were perfectly 
at. Selecting
surviving households eliminates this source of bias by holding the sample constant.
The downside of this approach, of course, is that it provides no information on the pro-
les of non-surviving households|which could dier from those of surviving households.
To investigate this, we separately estimate the proles of non-surviving households through
their nal year of observation. As we show below, we nd that, while non-surviving house-
holds tend to have lower levels of wealth, the slopes of their wealth age proles are quite
7We use the RAND HRS data le, which is RAND's longitudinal le of commonly used HRS variables
linked by households across time. We supplement this le with our own calculations of the actuarial present
values of expected 
ows from Social Security, dened-benet pensions, life annuities, and transfer payments
such as veterans' benets, Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income. See Appendix 1 for details.
5similar to the survivor group|in particular, median annualized wealth rises at similar rates
regardless of survival status. We conclude that survivorship bias is not driving the tendency
for annualized wealth proles to rise in the HRS.
Table 1 reports some demographic information for our sample of 4,630 households in
2006. The average age is about 80 (for married households, we take the maximum of the
spouses' ages). Nearly half are single women (many of them widowed), about 37% are
married, and 14% are single men. Average annual income is about $47,000. High school is
the highest degree for just over half the sample. About 10% are nonwhite and 5% Hispanic.
About two-fths report being in fair or poor health, and the average household spent about
$2,500 on out-of-pocket on medical care during the prior year.8
For selected survey years, Table 2 provides a breakdown of the components of com-
prehensive wealth for the median surviving household aged 70-75 in 1998.9 Because the
median is a nonlinear statistic, median comprehensive wealth will not generally equal the
sum of the component medians. To generate a table in which the components add up to the
total median comprehensive wealth for a given year, we calculate mean values of a trimmed
sample selected so that the mean comprehensive wealth of the trimmed sample is equal
to the median of the original sample. Thus, the rows of the table can be thought of as
representing the average breakdown of median comprehensive wealth in each year.
As shown in the table, just over half of median comprehensive wealth is made up of
the present value of annuity-like benets in 1998|the largest of which is Social Security.
However, the share of wealth from this source declines over time as life expectancies fall.
Financial wealth, in contrast, maintains a roughly constant share of about one-fth of com-
prehensive wealth. Nonnancial wealth (mostly housing) increases its share signicantly,
from a quarter to over a third, due in part to extraordinary capital gains over this time
period. The remainder of our analysis will focus on our measure of annualized wealth.
3 A Measure of Annualized Wealth for Retirees
3.1 Denition of annualized wealth
We dene annualized wealth to convert our broad measure of net wealth into an amount of
annual resources available per person over their expected remaining lifetimes. Our measure
of annualized wealth can be thought of as the per-person annual payout from an actuarially
fair, in
ation-indexed, joint xed life annuity that a retired household could, in theory, pur-
8The survey actually asks about spending over the prior two years. We assume the spending was evenly
divided over each of the prior two years.
9Choosing a single cohort helps distinguish age eects from cohort eects by holding the cohort constant.
6chase with its comprehensive wealth balance (see Brown and Poterba (2000)).10 However,
as we describe below, annualized wealth is also closely related to optimal consumption in
some simple life-cycle model specications.
For each household, we dene annualized wealth as
AWt = atWt;
where Wt is the household's comprehensive wealth balances at age t, and at is the annualiz-
ing factor that converts the balance into dollars per person per expected year of remaining





















t+i is the probability that a female currently aged t lives to age t + i, Sm
t+i is the
analogous probability for males, T is the maximum attainable age for any person, r is
the real discount rate (assumed to be constant)11, and  is an adjustment for household
economies of scale (  2) that may allow couples to spend less per person than single
retirees.12
Table 3 illustrates how our annualizing factor varies with age and marital status. For
a given age, couples have lower factors because they have to share resources (though with
some economies of scale, as noted above). Single men have lower life expectancies, and thus
higher annualizing factors (i.e., they can aord to spend more per year) than single women.
As households age, life expectancies fall, causing the annualizing factors to rise.
10For practical purposes, Social Security is such an annuity. In general, however, we view annualized
wealth as a hypothetical construct because, in the U.S. at least, prices for actual xed life annuities are far
from actuarially fair. See, for example, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999).
11We assume a real interest rate of 2.5 percent and an in
ation rate of 2 percent, in line with recent values
of the in
ation-indexed long-term average interest rate. According to the Federal Reserve Statistical Release
H15, the average yields on TIPS with maturities longer than 10 years was 2.26 percent for the 2003{2007
period reported in the table. The average value of 10-year nominal Treasuries over the same period is 4.40
percent.
12In the absence of scale economies,  = 2. See Citro and Michael (1995) and Fern andes-Villaverde and
Krueger (2007) for a detailed discussion of household equivalence scales and their eect on the measurement
of household resources. We adopt an equivalence scale of 1.67 for a two-person household. For comparison,
the OECD scale for a two-adult household is 1.7 and the scale recommended in Citro and Michael (1995)
for a two-adult household is 1.62 (= 2
0:7). In our HRS sample of older households, about 15 percent of
households contain more than two members (either children living at home or other adults). Adjusting
our annualizing factor for more complicated family structures would require modeling the likelihood that
the additional members remain in the family unit, and would require data on any resources that might be
contributed by the additional member during his or her time in the household. In the absence of such data,
we ignore the eect of additional members on the equivalence scale.
73.2 Annualized wealth and optimal consumption in the life cycle model
Annualized wealth resembles optimal consumption from the permanent income hypothesis,
but only in the simplest of life-cycle models will consumption and annualized wealth be
identical. Figure 1 shows the relationship between consumption and annualized wealth in
a stylized stochastic life cycle model.13 The purpose of this gure is purely illustrative:
although we set the initial wealth levels to the median levels in the HRS, no attempt is
made here to match individual-level characteristics (though we will do so below).
Panel (a) of the gure shows that in the simplest life cycle model of consumption dur-
ing retirement|a stripped-down version in which forward-looking, retired households are
uncertain about their longevity, but not about anything else that aects their spending
decisions|our measure of annualized wealth is very close to the optimal level of consump-
tion for all ages.14 Adding an explicit bequest motive, shown in panel (b), drives a wedge
between the levels of annualized wealth and optimal consumption as households age|at
least among those retirees who have \enough" resources for the bequest motive to operate
strongly. But even with a relatively strong bequest motive, the growth of annualized wealth
is relatively slow, on the order of about 1 percent per year from age 65 to 83.
Panel (c) shows age proles from a simulated life cycle model that ignores any explicit
bequest motive, but that includes a precautionary saving motive for retirees. In this version
of the model, retirees realize random draws for (potentially large) out-of-pocket medical
expenses that essentially serve as \resource shocks" with no separate utility value. As in
the specication with the bequest motive, the precautionary motive can be seen to drive a
wedge between the levels of annualized wealth and optimal consumption during retirement.
The precautionary motive also increases the slope of the two age proles: in panel (c), both
proles slope up from age 65 through 83, then slope down fairly steeply over the remainder
of old age.
Finally, a model with both precautionary and bequest motives, shown in panel (d),
generates the largest wedge between the levels and the slopes of the two proles. The
combination of the two motives leads retirees to build up relatively large buers of resources
relative to life expectancy from age 65 to about 83, then to essentially maintain the large
buer in old age even as their rates of survival drop sharply.
Note that the bequest motive and the precautionary motive in these calibrations of
the life cycle model can be expected to generate a modest 1-to-2-percent upward slope
13The life cycle models used to generate this gure are similar to the models used below to compare to
empirically estimated age-wealth proles. Details of the models are given in Appendix 2.
14The dierence between annualized wealth and consumption depends on the degree of relative risk aver-
sion and on the value of assets retirees bring into retirement relative to their Social Security and DB pension
benets. The close correspondence between consumption and annualized wealth holds for moderate degrees
of risk aversion; under log utility, annualized wealth is exactly equal to optimal consumption at each age.
8for annualized wealth in the rst stage of retirement (say, from age 65 to 83). Thus, if a
downward sloping age prole for annualized wealth were prevalent in the HRS data, we
would be tempted to infer that many retirees seemed to be \running out of money" early
in retirement and we would want to think about why this is happening. By contrast, if
a substantially upward sloping age prole were prevalent in the data, we would wonder
why so many in the HRS were \saving so much money"|even relative to life cycle models
calibrated to include plausible bequest motives and precautionary motives.
3.3 Annualized wealth in the HRS
Table 4 reports median levels of comprehensive wealth and annualized wealth for a balanced
1998{2006 panel of households aged 70 to 75 in 1998.15 For the median household in this
cohort, comprehensive balances fall from $493,000 in 1998 to $434,000 in 2002 and to
$393,000 in 2006|an average rate of decrease of 3.7 percent per year. However, because
of decreases in household size and life expectancies, annualizing factors rise considerably,
and thus annualized comprehensive wealth grows markedly over the 8-year period|from
$32,800 per person per expected year of life in 1998 to $35,400 in 2002 and to $42,200 in
2006. This represents an average annual increase in annualized wealth of 4.3 percent per
year, or nearly 30 percent, cumulatively, from 1998 through 2006. Thus, we nd that while
comprehensive wealth declines with age, it declines much more slowly than life expectancies
shorten.
The middle section of Table 4 compares changes in the annualizing factors and annual-
ized wealth of retirees in the cohort who were single in 1998 with those who were married
in that year. While both single and married retirees in the HRS experienced signicant
increases in annualized comprehensive wealth between 1998 and 2006, the increases were
somewhat larger for couples (4.7 percent per year, on average) than for single retirees (3.7
percent). One reason for this dierence is that some spouses die during the period, leading
to a jump in their households' annualizing factor (owing to the steep drop in the \overall"
life expectancy) and therefore in the amount of annualized wealth that can be aorded with
a given comprehensive wealth balance.
The bottom section of the table compares the trajectory of annualized wealth from 1998
to 2006 for households in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution with those in the
top 20 percent. The conclusions are similar to those above. The median retired household in
both income groups experienced a signicant increase in annualized comprehensive wealth
15As discussed above, the balanced panel has the advantage of mitigating the \classical problem" of sur-
vivorship bias that aects similar tabulations computed using cross-section data. As explained in Shorrocks
(1975) and Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), the classical problem is that if wealthier individuals are more likely
to survive to older ages, then cross-section data will tend to show a positive association between wealth and
age, as the less wealthy individuals are \over-represented" in the younger age groups.
9over the 8-year period covered by our HRS data, but the rate of increase was larger for
retirees in the high-income group than in the low-income group. The quantitative dierence
in the slope of the age prole for annualized wealth re
ected two factors: First, high-income
retirees spent down their comprehensive wealth balances more slowly than did low-income
retirees (0.6 percent per year, on average, vs. 5.6 percent); and second, high-income retirees
experienced a slower average rate of increase in their annualizing factors between 1998 and
2006, in part because they were more likely to stay married.
Table 5 shows that, for several subgroups of income and marital status, about 45 percent
of households experienced an increase in annualized wealth between 1998 and 2006 that was
25 percent or larger, while about 10 to 15 percent of households experienced a decrease in
annualized wealth of at least 25 percent.
As noted above, conning the analysis to individuals who survived until 2006 reveals
nothing about the possibly dierent trajectories for non-survivors. When we calculate
changes in wealth among households who drop out before 2006, we nd that they do indeed
have lower levels of annualized wealth|about $24,000 per person per year at the median
in 1998, compared to $33,000 among survivors|but the trajectory of annualized wealth is
quite similar|growth of about 3.4 percent per year for non-survivors, vs. 4.3 percent per
year among survivors. Moreover, the distribution of annualized wealth changes is essentially
identical between the two groups.
4 Age-Wealth Proles in the HRS
As a preliminary empirical look at the evolution of resources over the course of retirement,
we construct nonparametric proles of median wealth in the HRS between the ages of 65 and
90 years.16 Although nonparametric age proles have a number of drawbacks (in particular,
they do not control for cohort eects, survivorship bias, or household characteristics) they
provide a sense of the raw data patterns without imposing any structural assumptions.17
Figure 2 shows that median annualized nancial wealth is rising in real terms for most
cohorts over the panel period (despite volatility in the stock market), but the combined
prole in nancial wealth across cohorts is relatively 
at across the entire age distribution.
This suggests that households do not appear to run down their nancial wealth any more or
16To produce these proles, we divide the surviving 1998 sample into age bins and calculate the median
value of wealth for each bin over the following eight years. We use the HRS sampling weights to compute
the medians in each age group. We plot six points for each age group, corresponding to the 1998, 2000,
2002, 2004 and 2006 waves of the HRS. Arrayed by age on the horizontal axis, the series of segments trace
out an empirical age prole of wealth.
17To conserve on space, we omit the raw proles for the components of wealth balances (as opposed
to annualized wealth). At the median, the raw proles for median comprehensive wealth and all of its
components decline markedly with age, suggesting that some degree of spend-down is occurring.
10less quickly than their life expectancies are shortening. We also see within-cohort increases
in annualized nonnancial wealth, re
ecting the strong housing market over this period.
But in contrast to nancial wealth, we also see an increasing age prole of nonnancial
across cohorts, suggesting that households may be reluctant to fully consume their housing
wealth as they age. The annualized value of annuity-like wealth is, not surprisingly, roughly

at over the retirement period, with perhaps a slight decline due to non-indexation of some
benets. All told, the median value of annualized comprehensive wealth shows an upward
slope across older ages, from about $30,000 per person per year at age 65 to about $45,000
per person per year by age 90.
The raw proles provide a broad-brushed view of the trajectory of annualized wealth
within and across cohorts. To see whether these patterns hold up when we control for
cohort eects, year eects (such as market movements), and (at least partly) survivorship
bias, we turn to regression-based age proles of wealth. The general strategy is to pool all
observed wave-to-wave growth rates in wealth and regress the growth rates on age. The
coecients can then be used to construct age proles over the full range of ages from 65
to 90. The focus on wave-to-wave growth rates helps mitigate survivorship bias in two
ways. First, because the wave-to-wave growth rates are calculated only for households who
survive from one wave to the next, the slope estimates of annualized wealth will be unaected
by the \classical problem" of nonrandom attrition. At the same time, selecting wave-to-
wave survivors rather than full-panel survivors mitigates the sample selection problem that
arises because survivors may dier in their saving behavior (and in other ways) from non-
survivors.18 Second, we mitigate the bias further by focusing on growth rates rather than
levels. As noted above, there is much less dierence between survivors and nonsurvivors in
growth rates than in levels. While our methods help minimize the eects of survival bias,
we cannot claim to have eliminated it entirely|the fact remains that, for each age, we can
only calculate a wealth change among households who survive for at least two waves.
To produce the regression-based proles, we use a four-step procedure. First, we calcu-
late a household-level wealth-growth factor from each wave to the next (resulting in four
growth factors per household). Second, we pool all of the growth factors and estimate a
median regression of the growth factors on indicators for two-year age brackets (e.g., 60-61,
62-63, etc.) and survey-year dummies.19 Third, we use the estimated age coecients to
calculate predicted median growth factors for each age, and then multiply these together to
18Survivors are always dierent than nonsurvivors|for example, they tend to have more wealth|but the
dierential is smaller when survival is dened only to the next wave, rather than to the end of the panel.
19We use two-year age bins, rather than single-year age indicators, simply to smooth the age proles a
bit. The results are qualitatively the same when we use single-year age dummies. We use the survey-year
dummies to remove year eects (e.g. market conditions) when creating the proles. Rather than including
household characteristics in the regression, we estimate separate proles for dierent household groups, as
discussed below.
11construct a predicted \cumulative growth factor" across the full range of ages.20 Finally,
we connect the dots between each age's predicted cumulative growth factors to form an age
prole. The resulting prole will be purely relative (e.g., an index starting from one at age
65); to convert it to level terms, we benchmark the middle of each age prole so that it
passes through the median level of wealth held by 78-year-olds.
4.1 Proles by Household Type
Figure 3 shows the resulting proles of annualized comprehensive wealth, for various groups
of households. Panel (a) shows that the median prole of annualized wealth for all house-
holds increases fairly steeply from about $26,000 per person per year at age 65 to about
$52,000 at age 90. Panel (b) indicates an even steeper prole among married households,
with single men and women experiencing much more gradual increases.21 One should keep
in mind, however, that any remaining survival bias due to dierential mortality by wealth
is exacerbated when selecting married couples.22 Panel (c) shows median age proles by
income, where the income groups are dened conditional on marital status and age. We nd
that median annualized comprehensive wealth shows a gradual net increase for lower- and
middle-income households, and a pronounced rise for upper-income households. That is,
we nd a rising pattern of median annualized wealth across all of the income distribution.
Panel (d) breaks households down by race and demonstrates a signicantly steeper rise
in annualized wealth among white households than nonwhite or Hispanic households. Panel
(e) illustrates the eect of health status in 1998: healthy households show much more rapid
accumulation of annualized wealth than less healthy households. However, like marital
status, health status is variable over time, and thus the \healthy" prole is essentially
representing households who are healthy as of the base year, rather than healthy at age 65.
Finally, panel (f) groups households by their base-year level of out-of-pocket medical
expenses (where the groups are equal thirds of the expense distribution). We nd that the
slopes are quite similar across the groups until very old ages, when households with the
highest levels of medical expenses show decreasing annualized wealth. This could indicate
spend-down of resources in order to nance their medical care, or perhaps indicate increas-
20For example, if the predicted median growth factor for age 60-61 were 1.10 and the predicted median
growth factor for age 62-63 were 1.05, then the predicted cumulative growth factor for age 62-63 would be
1:10  1:05 = 1:155.
21Since we do not observe marital status as of age 65 for all households, we identify married households
based on their status in the base year of 1998. Thus the prole is best interpreted as the median among
\base-year-married" households, rather than among all households married at age 65.
22As a simple illustration, suppose that wealthy individuals of either gender survive to the next period
with probability 0.9 and that poor individuals survive with probability 0.8. Compare these dierential
probabilities with those of a married couple. If marriages end only in death, a wealthy married couple
will survive to the next period with probability 0.81, while a poor married couple will survive only with
probability 0.64.
12ing pessimism about life expectancy or quality of life, which could accelerate non-medical
spending as well. To get a better sense of how empirically estimated age proles might vary
with such expectations of the future, we group households by expectation using some of the
forward-looking questions in the HRS.
4.2 Proles by Household Expectation
Figure 4 breaks down estimated proles by expectations over mortality, bequests, and nurs-
ing home stays. Finally, we estimate the age prole of an alternative concept of annualized
wealth that excludes expected medical costs over the household's remaining lifetime.
Panel (a) shows that households who are more optimistic about their life expectancies
than the age- and gender-specic Social Security life tables have signicantly steeper in-
creases in annualized wealth, particularly at older ages. Thus, one motive for building up
wealth relative to life expectancies is to provide resources for more years than expected by
the standard tables.23
As shown in panel (b), the slope of the age prole also correlates with bequest expecta-
tions, especially at later ages.24 Households reporting low probability of a bequest display
quite 
at proles, while those with medium and high probabilities show much steeper pat-
terns, particularly after age 75 or so. Thus, another potential explanation for rising proles
is an explicit bequest motive.25
Panel (c) breaks out households by their reported probability of entering a nursing
home in the next 5 years, capturing some expectation about the likelihood of signicant
future medical expenses. We nd rising proles across all categories of nursing-home ex-
pectations, but signicantly steeper rises for middle- and high-probability households than
low-probability households. Thus, an additional possible explanation for rising proles is
precautionary savings arising from uncertain future medical expenses.
Panel (d) examines the eect of expected medical costs on annualized wealth. To the
extent that medical costs represent an exogenous shock to household resources, it may be
of interest to track the evolution of annualized wealth net of expected annualized medical
costs. We calculate each household's expected future medical costs by regressing log out-of-
pocket expenses on age, education, race, nancial wealth, and year dummies. We estimate
23We arbitrarily categorize households as \optimistic" if the ratio of their own survival probability to that
implied by the life table is greater than 120%. Similiarly, we categorize households as \pessimistic" if the
ratio is less than 80%.
24The question asks households for their subjective probability that they will leave a bequest of at least
$100,000. We arbitrarily categorize households as \high" if they report a probability of at least 80%, and
\low" if the reported probability is less than 20%.
25Note, however, that the question is phrased as a bequest expectation rather than a bequest motive. There
is a conceptual dierence due to accidental bequests: a household that is self-insuring against outliving its
resources may acknowledge the possibility of leaving an unplanned bequest (i.e., dying early) even if it places
little value on doing so.
13separate regressions for married couples, single males, and single females, and then use the
coecients to compute predicted present value medical costs for each household. As shown
in the gure, subtracting the annualized value of expected medical costs has remarkably little
eect on the trajectory of annualized wealth|because annual expected costs are generally
small (about $700 at the median). Moreover, we nd essentially no correlation between
changes in annualized wealth and medical expenses.
4.3 The eect of capital gains on the estimated age proles
How should we interpret the build-up in wealth relative to life expectancy at the end of
the life cycle? One question is whether the upward-sloping age proles are simply the
consequence of unexpected capital gains on housing or corporate equity over the 1998-2006
sample period.26 To test the sensitivity of our results to these changes in capital gains,
we re-estimate the regression-based age proles using a counterfactual HRS dataset that
holds each household's level of corporate equity and net housing wealth xed over the
sample years, letting the other components of comprehensive wealth follow their reported
trajectories in the HRS. To remove capital gains from equities, we replace each household's
reported holdings of corporate equity in each wave with its (household-specic) average
value over the eight-year period. To remove the eects of the dramatic run-up in house
prices, we replace each non-moving household's reported housing wealth in the ve waves
with the level it reported in 1998 (thereby assuming no change in housing wealth over our
sample period).27
Perhaps surprisingly, we nd that these adjustments to the reported measures of com-
prehensive wealth in the HRS do not materially change our result that median annualized
wealth rises with age across all three income groups. The proles continue to slope up for
two reasons: rst, other forms of nancial and nonnancial wealth (such as deposits, money
market funds, mutual funds, vehicles, and business equity) increased notably in annualized
terms across waves of the HRS. But more importantly, we nd a rising slope of wealth
across cohorts, re
ecting dierent starting levels of wealth by age as of the base year of
1998. Thus, we conclude that the upward sloping age prole for annualized comprehensive
wealth over retirement is not being driven by the eects of unanticipated capital gains on
corporate equity or housing over our sample period.
26Equity prices gyrated markedly over the sample period. The change in the Wilshire 5000 stock price
index between 1998 and 2000 was 7.6 percent, between 2000 and 2002 was -31.5 percent, between 2002 and
2004 was 43.5 percent, and between 2004 and 2006 was 19.1 percent. Housing prices, in contrast, climbed
steadily and substantially. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the cumulative change in the national purchase-
only house price index produced by the Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) between
1998 and 2006 was 72.9 percent.
27We do not change the housing wealth of movers, because these wealth changes may not be due to capital
gains|that is, these households may have either downsized or upsized their housing consumption.
145 Age-Wealth Proles in a Life Cycle Model of Consumption
To shed more light on how we might interpret rising age proles of annualized wealth, we
compare the empirical proles to those generated by fairly standard specications of the
life cycle model of consumption. Our model is similar to those used in other studies;28 our
contribution is to focus on proles of annualized wealth and compare the simulated paths
to our empirically estimated proles. A simple specication of the life cycle model|one
that allows for uncertainty only in survival and in which the discount rate is equal to the
interest rate|would predict a downward-sloping trajectory of annualized wealth at older
ages, due to the eects of survival discounting. That is, model households place increasing
weight on current consumption relative to future consumption as they age and their survival
probabilities fall, leading to an acceleration of wealth drawdown and a consequent decline
in the growth rate of annualized wealth toward the end of the life cycle.
To see whether the life cycle framework can generate the upward-sloping annualized
wealth patterns seen in the data, we consider four variations of the standard lifecycle model.
Starting with a baseline specication that introduces uncertainty only through survival, we
layer on, sequentially, a bequest motive, medical expense uncertainty, and a combination
of all of the above. The model specications, described in detail in Appendix 2, adapt the
cash-on-hand framework of Carroll (1997) and others to allow for household composition
changes (see, e.g., Cubeddo and R os-Rull (2005)) and bequests.
The value of this exercise is twofold. First, because the focus of our paper is on annu-
alized wealth, we want to understand how annualized wealth behaves in standard life cycle
model specications, and how well the models t the data from this perspective. Second, the
exercise allows us to parse the relative contributions of uncertain lifetimes, bequests and
precautionary saving in explaining the empirical trajectory of annualized wealth. Thus,
while others have shown that wealth patterns in the data are broadly consistent with vari-
ous specications of a life cycle model, we try to identify the features and parameterization
that best explain the age prole of annualized wealth in the HRS.
5.1 Simulations
To see how well our standard life cycle model ts the HRS data, we present two bench-
marking exercises. The rst simulates household annualized wealth starting from an initial
distribution that matches aggregate characteristics of HRS households aged 65-70, and
28See, for example, Cagetti (2003); Carroll (1992, 1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1998) for models of
precautionary saving in response to uncertain income, Palumbo (1999); Rust and Phelan (1997); French
and Jones (2004); Anderson, French, and Lam (2004) and Davis (2006) for studies of the eect of uncertain
medical expenses, and Kotliko and Summers (1981); Hurd (1987, 1989); Bernheim (1991); Laitner and
Juster (1996); Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002); De Nardi (2004) and Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) for
models incorporating explicit bequest motives.
15the second simulates annualized wealth growth rates household-by-household for our full
sample. To the extent that older households in the HRS entered retirement with similar
distributions of wealth, income, and marital status as younger HRS households, the rst
simulation exercise tests the model's ability to predict the evolution of annualized wealth
over the course of retirement. The second exercise, which benchmarks the model to house-
holds of all ages in retirement, provides a measure of how well the model predicts the growth
of annualized wealth for each household in our sample.
The rst simulation exercise begins with an initial distribution of wealth, income, educa-
tion, and marital status for respondents aged 65-70. From an empirical distribution of 8,105
households, we randomly draw (with replacement) 20,000 observations to form an initial
distribution of characteristics for the simulations. Starting from the initial distribution, we
then simulate the 20,000 life histories, allowing for 
uctuations in net retirement income,
as well as for transitions from marriage to widowhood.
For each of our four specications, Table 6 compares the median growth rates in the
HRS with those from our simulated life histories. The rst column shows that the baseline
specication produces consistently negative growth rates, re
ecting the discounting eect of
declining survival probabilities. As shown in the remaining columns of the table, a combi-
nation of bequests and uncertain medical costs can generate upward-sloping trajectories of
annualized wealth, but the age patterns and magnitudes do not always agree with the pat-
terns in the HRS. For example, while medical expenses and bequests each generate positive
growth rates of annualized wealth for all age groups combined, they aect older and younger
households dierently. Medical expense risk increases the growth of annualized wealth for
younger households, who retain savings as a buer against the consequences of a shock to
permanent income, consequences which are larger the more years of future income that are
at stake. Bequests, in contrast, tend to have the largest eect on the growth rates of older
households, whose stocks of intended bequests grow large in relation to life expectancy. Al-
though the t of the model is far from perfect, it does modestly well at matching the median
annualized wealth patterns in the HRS, and it does so with a common parameterization of
risk aversion and impatience.
The second simulation experiment uses each household's actual income net of med-
ical costs, marital status, ages, education, and cash on hand in each year to predict a
household-specic growth rate of annualized wealth, taking as given a household-specic
bequest parameter.29 Our procedure for selecting household-specic bequest parameters
29We pool the entire sample and estimate the growth of annualized wealth for all of our households in
multiple years. As an alternative estimation procedure, we also experimented with using each household's
actual income and medical expense 
uctuations (in addition to information about changes in marital status)
over the 1998-2006 sample period to compute an average simulated growth rate of annualized wealth. Using
the expected path of income for each household type, we calculated the permanent shocks as the average
annual percentage deviations of the actual income path from the predicted path and the transitory shocks
16assumes that each household correctly projects the likelihood that they will leave a bequest
of at least $100,000.30 For each household bequest probability, we search over a vector
of bequest parameters to nd the one that generates the closest t between the empirical
probability and the simulated fraction of bequests over $100,000. One advantage of this
matching procedure is that it adjusts for the tendency for wealthier households to leave
large accidental bequests. As noted above, the HRS question does not distinguish between
accidental and intentional bequests|it simply asks about the probability of leaving a siz-
able inheritance. According to our procedure, a wealthy household expecting to leave a
$100,000 bequest with a 50% probability will receive a smaller bequest parameter than a
poorer household reporting the same probability.
Table 7 shows the results for the household-by-household simulation.31 As in the rst
simulation exercise, the baseline model generates negative growth rates of annualized wealth.
Comparing the last three columns of the table, we can see that a model that includes both
a bequest motive and uncertain medical expenses produces results that are more in line
with the HRS than those produced by models with a bequest motive or medical costs in
isolation. Further, when the bequest parameter is calibrated according to each household's
stated probability of leaving a bequest, we see a smaller eect of bequests on the median
growth rate of annualized wealth among older households. Intuitively, households with
substantial resources in retirement reporting only a medium-sized probability of leaving a
bequest will need only a small bequest parameter to rationalize their stated expectations.
6 Conclusion
By examining the trajectory of annualized comprehensive wealth|a measure of total re-
sources per person per expected remaining year of retirement|our analysis brings some
saving patterns into relief that would otherwise be dicult to discern. Our primary em-
pirical nding from the HRS is that annualized comprehensive wealth tends to rise with
age in retirement, re
ecting the tendency for wealth balances to decrease more slowly than
remaining life expectancies shorten. We nd this pattern of increasing annualized wealth
over retirement for most types of households and for the major components of compre-
hensive wealth. In addition, we estimate that a much larger share of retirees experience a
as the dierence between each year's deviation from predicted growth and the permanent shock. The t
was not improved by such an exercise|the volatility in reported household income net of medical costs
generated noisy estimates of annualized growth|so we report the results from the more straightforward
procedure that uses pooled household information for each year.
30The HRS asks respondents: \[W]hat are the chances that you [and your] [you/husband/wife/partner]
will leave an inheritance totaling $100,000 or more?"
31The HRS data column shows dierent values than those in the previous table because this is a dierent,
randomly-selected sample of 5,000 observations. Not surprisingly, the samples disagree most for the oldest
(and therefore most sparsely represented) households in the data.
17considerable increase in annualized comprehensive wealth over the six years covered by our
HRS sample (1998 to 2006) than experience a signicant decline.
It is reasonably well known that retirees in the bottom quintile of the income distribution
(conditional on their age and marital status) rely almost exclusively on DB pension benets,
Social Security benets, and other government transfers to nance spending. Although
these sources do not constitute a high level of comprehensive wealth, their annuity-like
payout scheme means that they can nance a more or less constant path of outlays through
retirement. While annuity-like benets are also an important source of wealth for retirees in
the middle- and upper-income groups, these retirees also tend to have signicant nancial
and nonnancial wealth. A new nding from our analysis is that, for the median retiree in
the middle- and upper-income groups, annualized comprehensive wealth tends to rise over
retirement. One might have expected wealth balances to fall roughly in line with declining
longevity in retirement|after all, this is the trajectory that would be predicted by the
simplest life cycle model of consumption.
To gauge what factors might lie behind the tendency for annualized comprehensive
wealth to rise in retirement, we compare the empirical age proles of annualized wealth from
the HRS data with simulated proles from life cycle models that are extended to include
uncertainty about longevity, precautionary saving in light of uncertain medical expenses,
and an explicit motive for retirees with greater resources to leave bequests. Within the class
of models we consider, specications that include all three of these factors seem to line up
best with the rate of increase of annualized comprehensive wealth in the HRS data. In this
case, saving in retirement (relative to the simplest life cycle benchmark) provides insurance
against the possibility of nancing consumption into advanced ages, is available to help
nance possibly very large medical expenditures, and it increases the size of intended (as
well as unanticipated) bequests. Quantitatively, the simulated age proles for annualized
wealth match up fairly well with the estimated proles, although the models are unable to
match the heterogeneity of annualized wealth patterns across individual households.
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22Appendix 1: Present Value Calculations for Comprehensive
Wealth
In this appendix, we discuss our method for computing present values of annuitized streams
of payments in the HRS. See Love, Smith, and McNair (2008) for additional details.
Dened-benet pensions
The HRS includes questions about current pension benets (for retirees) and expected future
pension benets (for workers). Since our sample selects households whose older member
is at least 65, we are primarily (but not exclusively) using data on retirees. Households
are asked about the current (or expected) pension amount (and start date, if they have
not yet begun), cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and survivors' benets.32 In the case
of working households, we use the expected pension at retirement; this serves to include
the value of benets not yet accrued. For DB plans with COLAs (about 40 percent of
the reported plans), we discount using a real interest rate. For plans without COLAs, we
discount using a nominal rate.
We dene the actuarial present value of pension wealth as the annual pension benet
multiplied by the sum of discounted annual survival probabilities, with an extra term ac-
counting for any payments made to the spouse after the death of the respondent.33 We
compute present values for each plan held by the respondent and spouse and sum them to
arrive at our calculation of household-level pension wealth. Some current workers report
that they expect to receive lump-sum payouts from their DB plans upon retirement; in
this case, we discount the lump sum back to the current age, again using life-table survival
probabilities.
The survival probabilities are based on the one-year age- and sex-specic conditional
death probabilities in the Social Security Administration's 2002 Period Life Table (SSA,
2006). Period life tables provide a snapshot of the mortality conditions prevailing in a single
year, rather than the expected mortality experience of a given cohort over time. For young
cohorts (e.g., children born in 2002), one might expect actual longevity to be signicantly
greater than shown in the 2002 period life table, since longevity generally improves over
time. However, since our sample is of older households in 2006, we conclude that the 2002
period table is a reasonable estimate of our sample's expected mortality experience.34
32We use self-reported pension data to calculate pension wealth. Because most of the sample is cur-
rently receiving benets, we are less concerned about households' misunderstanding or ignorance of pension
formulas.
33Bernheim (1987) argues that actuarial discounting is inappropriate for risk-averse individuals facing im-
perfect annuity markets, because such individuals would attach additional value to the otherwise unavailable
insurance product. He suggests straight discounting (ignoring the probability of death) instead. However,
he points out that his analysis rests on the premise that individuals place no value on the death-contingent
value of assets (i.e., that there are no bequest motives). We treat the household as a unit, and explicitly
value the death-contingent component of each individual's assets (e.g., survivors' benets and life insurance).
Thus we use the actuarial present value of DB and Social Security benets. Note that we are only computing
the amount of wealth, and not the utility value of that wealth. Similarly, we make no adjustment in the PV
calculation for the utility value of risk (e.g., longevity risk or the risk of a large medical-expense shock.)
34Note that these are average survival for the population. Thus, to the extent that, for example, lower-
wealth respondents face lower survival probabilities than higher-wealth respondents, our calculations will
23Social Security benets
The present value of Social Security benets is computed in a similar manner, with the
main dierences being that Social Security benets are always indexed for in
ation and
that survivors' benets entitle retirement-age widows or widowers to 100% of the spouse's
benets if these exceed their own benet amount.35
Annuities and welfare benets
The present value of annuity wealth is calculated in the same way as pensions, where we
make similar adjustments for COLAs and survivor benets. Our measure of expected wel-
fare payments includes veteran's benets, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
and other welfare. In this calculation, we assume that individuals who are currently receiv-
ing these payments will continue to receive the same in
ation-indexed welfare payments
as long as they live. Moreover, we apply SSI as a 
oor to our calculation of annualized
wealth|that is, we assume that current nonrecipients will begin to receive SSI if their re-
sources fall suciently low in the future.36 Since welfare benets are typically indexed to
in
ation, we discount this stream of expected welfare payments using the real interest rate
and the relevant conditional survival probabilities.
Annualized values of annuity-type wealth
Note that the annual benets from annuity-type sources such as pensions, annuities, and
Social Security are not, in general, equivalent to the annualized present values of these
sources of wealth. For example, because DB benets are not typically adjusted for in
ation,
the real value of benets will decline over time relative to their annualized present value.
(The annualized present value in period t of a declining real stream of payments will always
be less than or equal to the real value of a single payment from that stream in period t, with
equality only in the nal period.) Moreover, the annualized present value takes account of
any benet changes expected to occur as a result of spousal deaths. For annuity payments,
like Social Security, that pay out in real terms, annualized wealth will be identical to the
benet stream for a single-member household. We convert annuity-type benet streams
into a present value and then back into an annuity in order to account for the eects of
non-indexation of benets and survivors benets on the resource stream of married couples.
tend to overstate the pension wealth of the lower-wealth groups and to understate the pension wealth of
the higher-wealth groups. However, we do not expect this to be a large eect because dierential mortality
seems to be evident primarily at very old ages (see Anderson, French, and Lam (2004) and Attanasio and
Hoynes (2000)), where heavy discounting is already being applied for most retirees.
35Again, since the vast majority of the sample is already receiving benets, we are less concerned about
households' ignorance of Social Security formulas. Moreover, annual notications of accrued benets from
the Social Security Administration help alleviate such concerns even among individuals who are still working.
36In practice, the SSI 
oor binds in very few cases in our sample.
24Appendix 2: Description of the Life Cycle Model Used in the
Simulations
6.1 The model
The life-cycle model augments the cash-on-hand framework of Carroll (1997) to allow for
household composition (see, e.g., Cubeddo and R os-Rull (2005)) and bequests. We will
describe only the nal specication since the others involve \turning o" select features.
In each period t, households choose an amount of consumption Ct that maximizes their
expected discounted utility from their current ages to a maximum age of 120, subject to a
budget constraint that represents a transition equation for cash on hand Xt|the sum of
wealth and current income|and a non-negativity constraint for wealth at each age.37 Since
we are interested in matching the behavior of retired households in the HRS, we conne
our solution to ages of 65 and older.38
Households dier by age, sex, marital status, and education. Spouses may be of dierent
ages but they are assumed to share the same education level. In dening the value functions,
it will be helpful to index a married couple with m, a single male with g, and a single female
with g. In each period t, a household of a particular type is constrained to consume no
more than the sum of saving from the previous period, R(Xt 1   Ct 1), and income net of
medical costs, Yt.39 The value function for a single (male) is given by:
Vt;g(Xt) = max
Ct
fug(Ct) + pg;tEtVg(Xt+1) + (1   pg;t)EtB(Xt+1)g; (A-1)
where
Xt+1 = R(Xt   Ct) + Yt+1 (A-2)
Xt  Ct; (A-3)
where ug(:) is the period utility function,  is the discount factor, pg;t is the conditional
survival probability, and B(:) is a bequest function. Period utility for a household of type









37A complete treatment of the life cycle from the beginning of working life would introduce potentially
interesting sources of heterogeneity in wealth and retirement income, but this type of heterogeneity is not
the focus of our analysis. For our purposes, little is lost by starting our model at retirement, and we gain
transparency and simplicity since we can show how dierent factors aect consumption patterns independent
of initial retirement wealth.
38Our modeling exercise diers from Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), which compares observed
wealth levels in the HRS with predicted levels using household-specic lifetime earnings.
39The formulation of income net of medical costs is a simplication of the process used in other work
on medical expenses, such as Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); Palumbo (1999); French and Jones
(2004). In contrast to these studies, we do not model social insurance, and we do not allow income net of
medical costs to become negative (as would be the case if households paid medical expenses in excess of
their retirement income). The simplication avoids non-convexities in the value function, which allows for
considerably faster computations.
25where ni is a scale adjustment,  is the coecient of relative risk aversion and 1= is the










where b determines the intensity of the bequest motive.
Married couples face a slightly dierent problem. Spouses typically face dierent survival
probabilities, and the longer-lived spouse has more incentive to save than the shorter-lived
one. We follow Cubeddo and R os-Rull (2005) and assume that the household solves a joint
maximization problem with (in our case) equal decision weights on the husband's and wife's
utilities and with current household consumption constrained to be split equally between
the spouses.40 The married couple's value function is given by:
Vt;m(Xt) = max
Ct









subject to equations (A-2)-(A-3). The three terms in the rst line of the value function
represent (1) the sum of each spouse's weighted utility from consuming Ct as a couple, (2)
the expected value of remaining married in the next period, and (3) the expected value of
bequeathing remaining cash on hand in the event that both members die in the next period.
The two expressions in the second line correspond to the weighted utilities of the husband
and wife, respectively.
We solve the model by rst normalizing the variables by permanent income Pt and then
using the normalized value functions to obtain consumption decision rules for each point
in the state space.41 In practice, we approximate the value functions by considering 200
endogenously chosen cash-on-hand values and by numerically computing the expectation
integrals with 10-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature for each of the transitory and permanent
shock distributions. By interpolating the resulting consumption decision rules, we can
simulate household consumption decisions for dierent ages, education levels, marital status,
income, and cash on hand.
6.2 Income process
The process for income net of medical costs follows Carroll (1997). Income Yt is the product
of a transitory shock t, a permanent shock Nt, and a growth factor Gt that captures
40The standard consumption Euler condition applies at the household level but not necessarily at the
individual level.
41See Carroll (2007) for an excellent introduction to solving models of this type. We apply Carroll's
(2006) method of endogenous gridpoints, which dramatically reduces computational time by working with
end-of-period saving rather than beginning-of-period cash on hand.
26changes in trend income over time and in response to changes in marital status:
Yt = Ptt (A-7)
Pt = GtPtNt; (A-8)









We estimate separate income age proles and covariance structures using the 1998-2006
waves of the HRS. We dene non-asset income in retirement as the sum of Social Security
benets, pension benets, private annuities, and any welfare payments, averaged over the
8-year period and measured in 2006 dollars. (We average income over the sample period
because our focus is on medical cost risk and large 
uctuations in annuitized retirement in-
come are likely to re
ect measurement error rather than true volatility.) From this measure
of income, we then subtract annual out-of-pocket medical costs to arrive at our measure
of income net of medical costs. Because we estimate the income proles using the natural
logarithm of net income, we restrict our sample to households with non-negative values of
net income. The restriction eliminates between 2 and 3 percent of the sample|presumably
those experiencing catastrophically large medical costs.42
We follow a two-step process in estimating the net-income process in the model. First,
for each education group, we regress the natural logarithm of net retirement income on age,
marital status dummies for single male and single female, and a set of 5-year birth-year
controls. The coecient estimates from this rst step allow us to construct average growth
rates for permanent income by education and marital status. In the second step of the pro-
cess, we estimate the covariance process of net retirement income by following the variance
decomposition procedure in Carroll and Samwick (1997).43 The coecient estimates (not
shown) imply a slightly declining age prole of net retirement income for high school and
college graduates, and a slightly upward sloping pattern for dropouts. The age pattern is
consistent with the means testing for Medicaid|lower-income households (dropouts) are
less likely to pay for large out-of-pocket expenses than high-income households. The esti-
mated variances show considerable volatility in both transitory and permanent components.
The estimates re
ect the large size of out-of-pocket expenses relative to income in retire-
ment. We estimate permanent variances (standard errors in parentheses) of 0:0368 (0:0015),
0:0263 (0:0006), and 0:0335 (0:0007) for household heads with less than high school, high
school, and college educations, respectively. The estimated transitory variances for the
three education categories are: 0:0729 (0:0048), 0:0583 (0:0018), and 0:0815 (0:0022).
42Allowing for negative net income, however, would rule out ecient numerical optimization techniques
by introducing nonconvexities in the value function. While these nonconvexities can generate interesting
economic behavior, they are not the focus of this section of the paper, which is to see whether the most




t denote the dierence between the unexplained part of net-income in period t + d and that in






, we can obtain parameter estimates by regressing
V ar(r
d
t) on a set of d's and a vector of 2's, adjusting for the two-year spacing of the HRS waves.
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Single Male (%) 13.6
Single Female (%) 49.6
Income (thous. $2006) 46.6
HS is Highest Degree (%) 54.2
College Degree (%) 18.0
Nonwhite (%) 10.5
Hispanic (%) 5.0
Fair or Poor Health (%) 41.4
OOP Medical Expense (thous. $2006) 2.5
Sample size is 4,630 households. Means calcu-
lated using HRS sample weights.
28Table 2: Components of Comprehensive Wealth: Surviving
Households Aged 70-75 in 1998*
Wealth (th. 2006 $) Share of CW (%)
1998 2002 2006 1998 2002 2006
Financial 98 92 82 20 21 21
Stocks
1 43 40 30 9 9 8
Other
2 55 52 52 11 12 13
Nonnancial 130 134 142 26 31 36
Housing 97 106 117 20 24 30
Other
3 34 28 25 7 7 6
Annuity-like benets 264 207 169 54 48 43
Social Security 177 139 115 36 32 29
DB Pensions 72 55 41 15 13 10
Other
4 15 13 13 3 3 3
Comprehensive Wealth 493 434 393 100 100 100
*For each year, the rows report means from a trimmed sample se-
lected so that the trimmed mean comprehensive wealth (CW) is equal
to the nontrimmed median; thus, the components sum to median
CW. Calculations use HRS sample weights. Sample size is 1,360 in
2006.
1Shares held directly and through mutual funds, trusts, and retire-
ment accounts.
2Liquid assets, bonds, and non-stock assets held in trusts and retire-
ment accounts.
3Vehicles and businesses.
4Life annuities and government transfers.
29Table 3: Sample Annualized Factors for Singles and Couples
Annualizing factor Annualized value of $500,000
Age of head Couple Single female Single male Couple Single female Single male
67 .043 .076 .089 $21,400 $38,000 $44,500
77 .063 .117 .141 $31,500 $58,500 $70,500
87 .096 .221 .272 $48,000 $110,500 $136,000
30Table 4: Evolution of Median Wealth: Surviving House-





Comp. Wealth (th. 2006 $) 493 434 393 -3.7
Annualizing Factor (%) 6.0 8.0 12.3 12.9
Ann. Wealth (th. 2006 $) 32.8 35.4 42.2 4.3
By Marital Status in 1998
Comp. Wealth (th. 2006 $)
Single 292 266 245 -2.9
Married 660 580 530 -3.6
Annualizing Factor (%)
Single 9.6 11.7 14.7 7.3
Married 5.3 6.5 8.2 7.6
Ann. Wealth (th. 2006 $)
Single in 1998 28.3 29.9 35.1 3.7
Married in 1998 35.5 39.4 46.8 4.7
By Income in 1998
Comp. Wealth (th. 2006 $)
Bottom 20% 234 197 166 -5.6
Top 20% 1077 1047 1039 -0.6
Annualizing Factor (%)
Bottom 20% 5.8 9.6 12.3 13.4
Top 20% 5.8 7.2 10.4 10.2
Ann. Wealth (th. 2006 $)
Bottom 20% 14.3 15.6 16.6 2.5
Top 20% 76.1 80.8 99.9 4.6
*Sample size is 1,360 in 2006. Income categories are dened
conditional on age and marital status in 1998.
Table 5: Distribution of Changes in Annualized Wealth from 1998 to 2006: Surviving
Households Aged 70-75 in 1998
Percent of Households with a Change
in Annualized Wealth that is:
Classication <-25% -25% to -10% -10% to 10% 10% to 25% >25%
Full Sample 12 10 19 14 45
Single in 1998 15 11 20 12 43
Married in 1998 11 9 19 15 46
Bottom 20% of Income in 1998 13 9 22 15 41
Top 20% of Income in 1998 15 9 14 15 46
*Sample size is 1,360 in 2006. Income categories are dened conditional on age and marital status
in 1998.
31Table 6: Simulated AW Growth Rates by Age and Marital Status*








< 70 1.00 0.03 0.95 1.98 2.23
71-80 2.37 -0.42 1.31 1.74 2.25
81+ 2.75 -1.65 1.98 -0.49 1.69
All 2.05 -0.69 1.48 1.44 2.21
Married couples
< 70 0.64 -0.55 0.05 1.26 1.42
71-80 1.97 -1.04 0.03 0.65 1.00
81+ 2.11 -1.64 0.31 -1.23 0.04
All 1.54 -1.25 0.06 0.37 0.85
Singles
< 70 1.48 0.71 2.10 2.92 3.28
71-80 2.84 -0.07 2.03 2.34 3.03
81+ 3.16 -1.64 2.15 -0.41 1.87
All 2.58 -0.46 2.10 1.86 2.81
*The table shows the median percentage growth rates of annualized wealth for the
HRS data and each of four dierent model specications. Each specication is solved
for a CRRA parameter  = 3, a discount factor  = 0:98, survival probabilities
according to the SSA life tables, and an initial simulated distribution of cash-on-
hand, income, demographics, and education that is sampled 20,000 times from the
HRS distribution of respondents aged 65-70. The second column, the \baseline"
specication, includes no bequest motive and no medical costs. The third column
adds to the baseline a bequest motive with parameter b = 3. The fourth column adds
to the baseline the uncertain medical costs described in the text. The last column
includes both the bequest motive and the uncertain medical costs.
32Table 7: Simulated AW Growth Rates by Age and Marital Status, Matched
at the Household Level*








< 70 1.54 0.02 1.56 0.62 1.78
71-80 2.41 -0.48 1.11 0.57 1.67
81+ 3.46 -1.57 -0.01 0.58 1.62
All 2.41 -0.66 0.90 0.58 1.68
Married couples
< 70 1.46 -0.31 1.25 0.30 1.46
71-80 2.07 -0.86 0.69 0.16 1.19
81+ 2.93 -3.09 -1.57 -0.86 0.04
All 1.92 -1.02 0.53 0.03 1.09
Singles
< 70 1.61 0.54 2.05 1.10 2.29
71-80 2.74 -0.01 1.62 1.09 2.26
81+ 3.68 -0.82 0.77 1.30 2.40
All 2.91 -0.29 1.29 1.16 2.31
*The table shows the median percentage growth rates of annualized wealth for the
HRS data and each of four dierent model specications. Each specication is solved
for a CRRA parameter  = 3, a discount factor  = 0:98, survival probabilities
according to the SSA 2004 period life tables, and an initial distribution of cash-on-
hand, income, demographics, and education for 5,000 randomly-selected households
in the 1998-2006 waves of the HRS. The second column, the \baseline" specication,
includes no bequest motive and no medical costs. The third column adds to the
baseline a bequest motive with bequest parameters matched at the household level,
in accordance with the households' stated probability of leaving an inheritance larger
than $100,000 (see text for details). The fourth column adds to the baseline the
uncertain medical costs described in the text. The last column includes both the
bequest motive and the uncertain medical costs.







































































(b) Model with bequest motive



































(c) Model with precautionary motive




































(d) Model with bequest and precautionary mo-
tives
Figure 1: Age Proles of Annualized Wealth and Optimal of the Life Cycle Model of
Spending in Retirement




























(a) Median Annualized Financial Wealth



























(b) Median Annualized Nonnancial
Wealth





























(c) Median Annualized Annuity Wealth





























(d) Median Annualized Comprehensive
Wealth
Figure 2: Nonparametric Age Proles of Median Annualized Wealth
35(a) Median ACW, by Marital Status in
1998
(b) Median ACW, by Race
(c) Median ACW, by Education (d) Median ACW, by Income in 1998
(e) Median ACW, by Health in 1998 (f) Median ACW, by OOP Medical Ex-
penses in 1998
Figure 3: Regression-based Age Proles of Median Annualized Comprehensive Wealth, for
Subgroups
36(a) Median ACW, by Mortality Expecta-
tion in 1998
(b) Median ACW, by Bequest Expectation
in 1998
(c) Median ACW, by Nursing Home Expec-
tation in 1998
(d) Median ACW, with and without Ex-
pected Medical Costs
Figure 4: Regression-based Age Proles of Median Annualized Comprehensive Wealth, by
Expectation Group
37